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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
HOTEL UTAH CO:JIPAXY, a corpora-
tion, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
R. H. DALRYMPLE, OTTO \YEIS-
LEY and H. FRED EGAN consti-
tuting the Utah Labor Relations 
Board, and LAUNDRY WORKERS 
LOCAL UNION NO. 316, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7290 
The petitioner herein, Hotel Utah Company, a cor-
poration, with its principal place of business at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, heretofore filed its petition with this 
Honorable Court for Writ of Certiorari to review the 
proceedings and order of the Utah Labor Relations 
Board. 
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On the 15th day of June, 1948, the Laundry Workers 
Local Union No. 316 filed its petition for investigation 
and Certification of Representatives as provided for by 
Title 49-1-17, Subsection (c), Utah Code Annotated 1943 
(Tr. 157). ·This petition alleged that the unit appropriate 
for the purposes of collective bargaining was the produc-
tion workers engaged in laundry work; that said unit 
was to exclude clerical workers and supervisors with 
the power to hire and fire. 
The Utah Labor Relations Board caused a notice 
to be served upon this petitioner, notifying it that a hear-
ing would be held on the 25th day of June, 1948, at the 
State Capitol at Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 122). 
On said day a hearing was conducted by the Honor-
able Daniel Edwards, as examiner. That at said hearing 
said Daniel Edwards granted a motion to continue the 
hearing, and made and entered his order, setting the 
matter for hearing on the 12th day of July, 1948. That 
on said 12th day of July, 1948, a hearing was held in 
conformance with said notice. 
On the 20th of July, 1948, the Utah Labor Relations 
Board made and entered its order (Tr. 99) determining 
that a unit for the purpose of collective bargaining 
consisted of the following: 
''All laundry production workers, and ex-
clude clerical workers and supervisors with the 
right to hire and fire." 
This order further provided that a cross-check of re-
spondent's payroll record be made from June 1 194:8 
' 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to and including- .June 15, 19-!8, with evidence of Union 
designation by en1ployees of Hotel Utah Con1pany in 
the unit herein to be detern1ined by the Board; it further 
provided that said cross-check be made on the 23rd 
day of August, 19-!8. 
On the 30th day of July, 19-±8, and before said 
cross-check was made by a representative of the Utah 
Labor Relations Board, the Hotel Utah Con1pany pro-
tested and objected to the said order (Tr. 69). It is 
objected to the order upon the following grounds: 
1. That there is evidence in the record to 
the effect that the employees executing the desig-
nations or applications known as Exhibit 1 in the 
record, did not know the purport of what they 
executed or signed. 2. That it has con1e to our 
attention within the past four ( 4) days that em-
ployees have advised us that when they executed 
Exhibit 1 they did not know that it was a desig-
nation of the Union as their representative; 
further that they were not told the real reason for 
the signing of Exhibit 1. 
On the 5th day of August, 1948 (Tr. 67), the Utah 
Labor Relations Board· issued a certification desig-
nating the Laundry Workers Local Union No. 316 to 
be the sole, collective bargaining representatives with 
respect to rates of pay, hours of labor and other con-
ditions of employment with respect to the following 
described unit: 
''All laundry production employees, and ex-
clude clerical workers and supervisors with power 
to hire and fire.'' 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On the lOth day of August, 1948, this petitioner 
made a motion to vacate and set aside the certification 
(Tr. 61). This motion in substance provided that the 
method of cross-check was not the suitable method to 
be used to ascertain the representative of the employees 
as provided for by Section 49-1-17, Sub-section (c). 
That the suitable method under the facts in this case 
in determining the representatives should be by secret 
ballot of the employees. Section 49-1-17, Subsection 
(c) provides as follows: 
(c) ''Whenever a question affecting instra-
state commerce or the orderly operation of in-
dustry arises concerning the representation of 
employees, the board may investigate such con-
troversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the 
name or names of the representatives that have 
been designated or selected. In any such investiga-
tion, the board shall provide for an appropriate 
hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction 
with a proceeding under section llor otherwise, 
and may take a secret b,allot of emp~oyees, or 
utilize any other suitable method to ascertain 
such representatives." (Italics ours) 
On the 20th day of August, 1948, the Utah Labor 
Relations Board denied the motion to vacate and set 
aside the certification (Tr. 59). 
On the 1st day of November, 1948, the Laundry 
\Vorkers Local Union No. 316 filed a charge with the 
Utah Labor Relations Board, alleging among other 
things that ·the Hotel Utah had refused to bargain 
with the Laundry Workers Local Union No. 316 (Tr. 1). 
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The Laundry \Yorkers Local Union No. 316 further 
alleged that it was the representative of the 1najority 
of respondent's employees in a collective bargaining 
unit. 
Pursuant to the charge, the Utah Labor Relations 
Board on the 18th day of November, 1948, issued its 
complaint alleging that the Hotel Utah Company had 
refused to bargain collectively and in good faith with 
Laundry \V orkers Local Union No. 316. 
The Hotel Utah Company (Tr. 12) filed its answer 
to the complaint. The Hotel Utah Company in its 
answer alleged as follows, in part: 
"4. In further answering said complaint, 
this respondent alleges that it has refused to 
bargain with Laundry Workers Local Union No. 
316, for the reason that the said Laundry 
Workers Union is not the duly authorized bar-
gaining representative of any of the employees 
of the respondent company; particularly, it is 
not the bargaining representative as provided for 
by the laws of the State of Utah, with respect to 
a purported appropriate unit as referred to in 
the proceedings heretofore held in this cause. 
That the unit purportedly found by the board to 
be an appropriate unit, is not, in fact, an appro-
priate unit for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing. 
5. This respondent further alleges that the 
Utah Labor Relations Board, in violation of the 
laws of the State of Utah, refused to permit the 
employees involved to express their choice of 
bargaining representatives by secret ballot. 
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6. This respondent alleges that under the 
circumstances and facts in this case, the only a p-
propriate and fair means of determining the de-
sires of the employees was by the holding of an 
election, thereby affording the opportunity to the 
employees to express their desires without any 
chance of coercion, intimidation, or influence of 
any kind.'' 
A hearing was held with respect to this matter on 
the 6th day of December, 1948; the Trial Examiner, 
Daniel Edwards, one of the Commissioners of the Utah 
Labor Relations Board, presiding. 
On the 5th day of January, 1949, the Trial Exam-
iner, Daniel Edwards, made and filed his examiner's 
report, findings of fact and recommended order ( Tr. 
19 to 21). The examiner recommended as follows : 
''1. That the Board order the Respondent, 
Hotel Utah Company, to cease and desist from 
any further unfair labor practice as set forth 
in Section 49-1-16, Subsection (1), Paragraph 
d), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended. 
2. That the Respondent enter into collective 
bargaining with tl1e Complainant as it relates to 
rates of pay, hours of labor and other conditions 
of employment within fifteen (15) days from this 
date. 
3. That the Respondent notify the Board 
of its con1pliance with the Board's Order." 
Within the time required by law, that is, the 15th 
day of January, 1949, the Hotel Utah Company filed 
its o~jections to the intermediate report of the Trial 
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.. 
~· 
Examiner and hi~ findings of fad and reeounnended 
order· ( Tr. :26 and 27). 
The Hotel Utah Cmnpany, anwng other thing:-;, 
made the follmYing objections to said report, findings 
of fact and recon1n1ended order: 
"There is no evidence to substantiate the 
findings of fact as contained in paragraph tive 
of said findings of fact: further there is no eYi-
dence to support the Board's action in deterrnin-
ing that the unit as set forth in paragraph fi,Te 
of said findings of fact, constitutes and is an etp-
propriate unit for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining; it is the position of said respondent that 
the unit as determined by the Board does uot ('011-
stitute an appropriate unit for the purpose '>f (·ol-
lective bargaining as provided for by the lJ ws 
of the State of Utah. 
''That the certification, as refe1 n:' l to in 
paragraph 6, is void and has no force and effect 
and designates that said certification was based 
upon applications and designations by ernplo~·ee;-;; 
that said en1ployees were not fully apprized of 
the signature of executing said applications aud 
designations; that because of the evidence in tl1i~ 
cause, an election should have been held, affording 
the employees the right to express their opinions, 
without any interference from anyone. The evi-
dence clearly shows that the Union was afraid 
of an election. The record further discloses that 
the only appropriate rnethod of determining the 
representative should have been by an election. 
''In view of the fact that there has been an 
improper determination of an appropriate unit 
for the purpose of collective bargaining, it c.an-
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not be said that this respondent has refused to 
bargain as provided by the laws of the State of 
Utah.'' 
On the 27th day of January, 1949, the Utah Labor 
Relations Board made and entered its order (Tr. 32), 
which is as follows : 
''The Utah Labor Relations Board, after con-
sideration of a statement of Respondent's Objec-
tions to Intermediate Report of Trial Exarniner, 
Finds of Fact and Recommended Order, concnrs 
with the Trial Examiner's Report issued Januan· 
5, 1949, and hereby orders: (Italics ours) 
1. That Respondent, Hotel Utah Company, 
cease and desist from any further unfair labor 
practice as set forth in Section 49-1-16, Subsec-
tion (1), Paragraph (d), Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as amended. 
2. That Respondent enter into collective 
bargaining with the Complainant as it relates 
to rates of pay, hours of labor and other condi-
tions of employment within fifteen (15) days from 
this date. 
3. That the Respondent notify the Board of 
its cmnpliance with the Board's Order." 
Attention is called to the order of the Board in 
which it states that it concurs with the Trial Examiner's 
report. It does not adopt the order of the Board; and 
the Board has not made any findings of fact and con-
clusions of law as required by Title 49-1-18, Subsection 
(c). The order of the Board (Tr. 32) is the only 
document issued by the Board with reference to this 
matter. 
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On February 1. H).!~), this petitioner, Hotel Utah 
Con1pany, filed its petition for writ of certiorari with 
the Clerk of the Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah. 
~-\SSIG N~IENTS OF ERROR 
1. The order of the Utah Labor Relations Board, 
dated the 27th day of January, 1949, is void in that it 
is not supported by any Findings of Fact, as provided 
for in ritle -!9-1-18, Subsection C, Utah Code Annotated 
1943. 
2. The Board erred in directing a cross check of 
the Company's payroll as the suitable method to ascer-
tain the representative of a majority of the employees. 
3. The Board erred in determining that the unit 
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining 
was ''all laundry production workers.'' 
4. The Utah Labor Relations Board erred in pro-
viding in its order that Hotel Utah Company cease and 
desist from any further unfair labor practice as set 
forth in Section 49-1-16, Subsection 1, paragraph (d), 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended. 
5. The Utah Labor Relations Board did not have 
the authority to issue any order or make any findings. 
ARGUMENT 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 
THE ORDER OF THE UTAH LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, DATED THE 27th DAY OF JANUARY, 1949, IS 
VOID IN THAT IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY FIND-
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INGS OF FACT AS PROVIDED FOR IN TITLE 49-1-18, SUB-
SECTION C, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943. 
Title 49-1-18 provides in part as follows : 
" .... then the Board shall state its findings of 
fact and shall issue and cause to be served on 
such person an order to cease and desist from 
such unfair labor practice, . . . . . '' 
The statute is clear and mandatory that the Utah 
Labor Relations Board shall state its findings of fact 
in each case. 
The record In this case discloses the fact that no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law were made or en-
tered by the Utah L-abor Relations Board. 
It is the position of this petitioner that it is manda-
tory upon the Board to make findings of fact upon all 
the n1aterial issues presented by the pleadings and neces-
sary for a proper disposition of the case. 
Title 49-1-18 further provides: 
'' .... The findings of the Board as to the facts, 
if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive .... '' 
By reason of the fact that no findings have been 
n1ade or entered in this cause, this petitioner is n.ot giv-
en an opportunity to assail the findings as unsupported 
by the evidence. 
The petitioner contends there were material issues 
presented by the pleadings in this cause, and that the 
disposition of the san1e was necessary for a proper 
disposition_ of the case; therefore,_ findings of fact were 
necessar:v with _r~_eference to these material issues. The 
petitioner will hereinafter set forth facts and circum-
10 
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:·· 
stances in the following assignments of error that jus-
tify the staten1ent set forth herein, that there were ma-
terial issues presented by the pleadings in this cause, 
and that the disposition of the same was necessary for 
proper disposition of the case. 
ASSIGN~IENT OF ERROR NO. 2 
THE BOARD ERRED IN DIRECTING A CROSS CHECK 
OF THE COMPANY'S PAYROLL AS THE SUITABLE ME~ 
THOD TO ASCERTAIN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A MA-
JORITY OF THE EMPLOYEES. 
Sec. -!9-1-17, subsection (c), Utah Code Annotated 
1943, provides in part as follows: 
'' .... In any such investigation, the board shall 
provide for an appropriate hearing upon due no-
tice, either in conjunction with a proceeding un-
der Section 11 Sec. 49-1-18) (insertion ours), and 
may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize 
any other suitable method to ascertain such rep-
resentatives.'' 
It will be noted that under the provisions of Section 
49-l-17, subsection (c) that the Board may take a secret 
ballot of employees or utilize any other suitable method. 
It would seem that the legislature, by specifically 
providing for an election, intended that this method 
should be used, unless there was some reason for not 
doing so ; it then provided for any other suitable method. 
Certainly there is no better method of ascertaining 
the desires of employees, than by an election. It is a 
quick, 0xpeditious way of ascertaining employee's de-
sires. 
11 
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• 
We are sure that it is not necessary before this 
Court to argue that the American system of elections, 
to determine the desires of its citizens, is a proper pro-
cedure. 
Further, we do not think it necessary to argue 
against the substitution of other methods, to take its 
place. 
We cannot understand why the Board in this case 
denied to the employees of the Hotel Utah Company 
the right to express their desires by a free and unmo-
lested election. 
The Board (Tr. 67) certified the Union as the bar-
gaining representative by comparing authorization forms 
submitted by the Union, with the payroll of the Com-
pany. The Board found that a majority had so desig-
nated. 
List of employees as submitted shows thirty-nine in 
employment (Tr. 70). Authorization cards (Tr. 71 to 93, 
inc.) show twenty-one employees of those on payroll 
had designated the Union as their representative. 
The record shows that the Union had a majority of 
three. Two people of this group could change the result. 
It is interesting to note that the authorizations (Tr. 
71 to 93, inc.) were not the first obtained by the Union. 
Previous authorizations were received (Tr. 124 to 
156, inc.) by the Board at the time of filing the Petition 
for Investigation on June 15, 1948 (Tr. 157). 
12 
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·..:. 
The subsequent authorizations were introduced at 
the hearing on June 2-!, 1948, as Exhibit 1 ( Tr. 165). 
It will be observed that there were thirty-two appli-
cations or authorizations originally filed as Exhibit A. 
Further, that when Exhibit 1 was filed, only twenty-one 
names matched those of the payroll. 
This petitioner objected to the introduction of Ex-
hibit 1 (Tr. 199). 
The Union refused to consent to an election (Tr. 
195). 
With only a majority of three, it is easily under-
standable why the Union was afraid to permit the em-
ployees to freely express their choice. Upon reading the 
transcript it is clear that the employees did not know 
exactly the purport of what they signed (Tr. 192). 
Without question, the only reason given to the em-
ployees to .sign Exhibit 1, was that it would strengthen 
the case if they were signed before a witness (Tr. 192). 
It can easily be seen why the company is not satis-
fied with the method used by the Utah Labor Relations 
Board in ascertaining the desires of the employees with 
reference to their bargaining representatives. 
For the Board to substitute a cross-check for the 
election procedure under the circumstances in this case 
does not make sense. 
One of the main objectives of the Utah Labor Rela-
tions Act, without question, is to encourage the practice 
13 
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and procedure of collective bargaining through em-
ployee representatives of their own choosing. 
One of the main obstacles to such collective bar-
gaining is uncertainty or disagreement concerning who 
has been designated by the employees as their represen-
tatives. Section 49-1-17, Subsection (c), Utah Code An-
notated 1943, is designed to remove this obstacle by cre-
ating n1achinery for the determination of such repre-
sentatives. 
It is very evident that the employer was not satis-
fied in using a method of cross-check under the circum-
stances. 
To effectuate the policies of the act, that is, to en-
courage collective bargaining, the Board should use the 
method of determining the bargaining r-epresentatives 
that would erase from anybody's mind any question as 
to the desires of the employees. 
In this case there was a question in the employer's 
mind as to whether the authorization cards actually rep-
resented the true desires of the employees. The reluc-
tance of the Union to submit to any election further cre-
ated a suspicion, and naturally so in the employer's 
n1ind. 
At the hearing of June 24, 1948, Mr. Harter and Mr. 
:1\fcEwan testified pertaining to the procurement of Ex-
hibit 1. It will be remembered that Exhibit 1 is the au-
thorization slips that were procured the night before the 
hearing of June 24, 1948, and which were procured in 
14 
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the interpretation of this petitioner without advising 
the employees the purport of the authorization slips. 
Section 49-1-17, Subsection (c) is identical with 
Title 29, Section 159, Subsection (c), United States Code 
Annotated. 
The National Labor Relations Board's usual prac-
tice, initiated in lllatter of The Cudahy Packing Co. and 
United Packinghouse Workers of Amerioa, etc., 13 N. L. 
R. B. 526, is to direct an election in a representation 
proceeding if the parties are in doubt or disagreement 
regarding the wishes of the employees even if there is 
only one labor organization claiming the status of nla-
jority representative. This was done even though au-
~orization cards showed a substantial majority in favor 
of the Union. 
The National Labor Relations Board has pointed 
out in this case that a certification looks to the initiation 
of collective bargaining and that bargaining relations 
would be more satisfactory from the beginning if the 
d~ubt and disagreement of the parties regarding the 
wishes of the employees is, as far as possible, elimin-
ated. The Board further stated in substance that even 
though they had in the past certified representatives 
without an election upon a showing, of the sort here 
made, they were persuaded by their experience that the 
policies of the act would best be effectuated upon the 
question of representation by resolving in an election 
by secret ballot. It has become clear that workers see 
secret ballots as the most democratic method of select-
15 
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ing their representatives, free from the coercion of their 
employer or the Union seeking to organize them. 
Since 1939 the Board has adhered faithfully to the 
policy expressed in the Cudahy Packing Case. 
There are certain fundamental standards which the 
Board is required to observe in the effectuation of the 
legislative purpose of the Utah Labor Relations Act; one 
of which is the traditional rule against the presumption 
of liability or bad faith. See Boeing Airplane Co. vs. N. 
L. R. B., 140 Fed. (2d) 423. 
Therefore, there should have been no fear in the 
Board's mind whatsoever in permitting an election to 
be held and the employees given the opportunity of free 
expression. The Labor Board has conducted many hear-
ings and they are well grounded in the procedure of 
conducting free and proper elections. 
It will he said, of course, that the Board in its dis-
cretion may adopt any method that it seems suitable to 
effectuate the purposes of the Act. However, when ob-
jection is made to the method of a cross-check and an-
other suitable method may be adopted which should be 
acceptable to all parties, we feel it is abuse of discre-
tion to adopt the method of cross-check. 
In reviewing all the facts in this case, together with 
the policy adopted by the National Labor Relations 
Board based upon its past experience, it seems without 
question that the Board abused its discretion in at-
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tempting to please the Union by only doing that which 
the Union requested. 
\Ye feel that the Board must realize that there are 
other parties to a controversy in matters of this kind, 
other than a labor organization. Everything that the 
Union requested was granted, regardless of the facts and 
circlmlstances. 
\Ye submit that an election should be held in this 
cause to permit the employees in the unit which is 
found to be a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining, to express their choice of a collective 
bargaining agency, by their free expression without 
coercion or fear of reprisal from anyone. 
A secret election is the only answer. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 
THE BOARD ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
UNIT APPROPRIATE FOR THE PURPOSES OF COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING WAS "ALL LAUNDRY PRODUCTION 
WORKERS." 
The petition for investigation and certification (Tr. 
157) filed on the 12th day of July, 1948, alleged that the 
following unit constituted a unit appropriate for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining: 
''Thirty-five production workers engaged in 
laundry work.'' 
A hearing was held with respect to said petition on 
the 24th day of June, 1948. Upon motion the hearing was 
continued until July 12, 1948. 
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On the 5th day of August, 1948, the Utah Labor Re-
lations Board (Tr. 67) issued its certification in which 
it certified the Laundry Workers Local Union 316 as 
the collective bargaining representative for the employ-
ees in the following described unit: 
''All laundry production workers and exclude 
clerical workers and supervisors with power to 
hire and fire.'' 
The Certification as issued by virtue of 49-1-17, is 
not an appealable order. See Southeast Furniture Com-
rpany vs. Industr~al Commission, 111 P. 2d 154. 
However, when an order made pursuant to Section 
49-1-18 is properly taken before a court of review (which 
is being done in the present case), that court then may 
review the regularity of the Board's action under 49-1-
17. 'See Southeast Furniture Company, supra. 
Orders issued by the Utah Labor Relations Board 
under 49-1-17 are preliminary in nature. They merely 
designate the proper bargaining agent. No action in-
volving an unfair labor practice is involved. However, 
orders under 49-1-18 are predicated upon a complaint, 
hearings and findings of fact. (We again call the atten-
tion of the court that in this case findings of fact were 
not stated by the Board.) They are orders to ''cease and 
desist.'' These are ''final orders'' which may by either 
party be taken to the courts for enforcement or review. 
Courts in reviewing such ''final order'' may also re-
view at that time the regularity of the Board's action 
18 
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under Section 49-1-17. See Southeast F\uniture COln-
pany, supra. 
Section 49-1-11, Subsection (b), Utah Code Anno-
tated Ul±3, proYides as follows: 
' ' (b) The board shall decide in each case 
whether in order to insure to employees the full 
benefit of their right to self-organization and to 
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate 
the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for 
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the 
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdi-
vision thereof.'' 
This section of the Utah Code was identical with 
the 'Yagner Act, known, however, as Title 29, Section 
159, United States Code Annotated, Subsection (b). This 
section, however, was amended by the Labor Manage-
ment .Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Law). However, for our 
purpose here, the amendment is immaterial. 
The establishment by the Utah Labor Relations 
Board of an appropriate unit or units for collective bar-
gaining purposes is a prerequisite to the resolutions of 
questions concerning representation. Each case must be 
decided on its own particular facts. 
In making this determination within this general 
rule, the Utah Labor Relations Board should consider 
a number of factors, the most important of which are: 
The history of collective bargaining and the history, ex-
tent and type of organization among the employees at 
the plant involved and at other plants of the same em-
ployer, or at plants of other employers in the same or 
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related industries; the skill, wages, and working condi-
tions of the employees; the desires of the employees; 
the eligibility of employees for membership in the union 
or unions involved; and the relationship between the 
unit or units proposed and the operation, organization, 
and management of the employer's business. 
It is the position of this respondent that the Utah 
Labor Relations Board must, in determining the unit 
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, 
consider all of the factors hereinabove enumerated. 
We refer this Honorable Board to the ·Twelfth An-
nual Report of the National Labor Relations Board for 
the year ending June 30, 1947, pages 18 and 19. The 
Board in its twelfth annual report again reiterated the 
factors hereinabove enumerated, as the ones they deem 
essential and necessary to consider when determining an 
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing. The Board in its annual report referred to many 
of the cases decided by the Board in support of these 
statements. 
For further reference we refer this Honorable Court 
to the Fourth Annual Report of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, found in Labor Relations Manual, Volume 
5, at page 31. 
It is v-ery important in any establishment to have 
what may be termed a homogeneous unit; that is, one 
that would make for better industrial ~elations. 
It is the position of this petitioner that there is no 
ev-idence whatsoever in this r'ecord to warrant the Board 
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111 determining that the unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining was the laundry produc-
tion workers. It is the position of the petitioner that 
there n1ust be evidenee to 8nbstantiate the Board's de-
termination. 
The only evidence which we ean find in the record 
IS the faet that ~Ir. Harter, the representative of the 
Union inYolYed, stated that the laundry unit was the ap-
propriate unit. For the convenience of the eourt, we are 
setting forth all the testimony in the reeord introduced 
by the Union with reference to what constitutes an ap~ 
propriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
(Tr. 161-164) : 
BY 1liR. BECK: 
Q. You may state your full name. 
A. Harry F. Harter. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Harter? 
A. 386 South 7th East. 
Q. What is your business? 
A. International Organizer for the Laundry 
Workers. 
Q. Where is your plaee of business? 
A. 69 South State S.treet. 
Q. In Salt Lake City? 
A. Y.es sir. 
Q. How long have you been identified with or-
ganized labor generally? 
A. Since 1936. 
Q. Are you aequainted with the business of the 
Respondent~ 
A. I am. 
Q. Where is it loeated ¥ 
A. South Temple and Main. 
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Q. In this city~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Is it engaged generally in the hotel busi-
ness~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And as a part of its business what does it 
operate which your labor organization cus-
tomarily takes jurisdiction~ 
A. Laundry work, linen for the hotel. 
Q. What kind of service does that include that 
you speak of~ 
A. Laundering linen. 
Q. Anything else~ 
A. That is all I know of. 
Q. Linen for what use~ 
A. To be used in the hotel. 
Q. Bedroom and table linen~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And also service to the culinary~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether or not such laundry 
has been operated in such manner you have 
indicated for some period of time~ 
A. -As long as I can remember. 
Q. Where is that laundry that you speak of? 
Where is it located~ 
A. Directly north of the hotel in the same 
block. · 
Q. Would you be good enough, Mr. Harter, to 
describe and define an employee unit ap-
propriate for the purpose of bargaining 
with the Employer with respect to hours 
and wages and conditions of employment, 
particularly in a unit over which your or-
ganization customarily takes jurisdiction~ 
1\fR. CALLISTER: Just a moment. I obj·ect to 
that as calling for a conclusion. 
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.JlH. BEt. 1K: That is a good objection. 
Q. Uo ahead. 
~-\. All en1ployees employed by the Hotel Utah 
in the laundry deparhnent in the production 
end of it. That includes the girls and boys 
in the wash room and the shakers and 
Inangles. 
Q. That includes the en1ployees operating the 
n1angles 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And operating the washing machines~ 
A. Yes sir, the shakers and pressers. 
Q. Yo uare speaking now for the most part 
with respect to the laundering and finish-
ing of linen for culinary service depart-
ments in the hotel~ 
.._-\.. Yes sir. 
Q. In other words, it would be a laundry unit 
you have described~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Within the plant and a part of the opera-
tions of the hotel~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Now give ::\Ir. Callister a chance to object 
before you answer. In your opinion is the 
unit you have described peculiarly a craft 
unit for the operation of that laundry~ 
~fR. CALLISTER: We object to it. on the 
ground that it is immaterial with reference 
to whether it is a craft unitor not. It has no 
materiality. The purpose of this proceeding 
is to determine the appropriate unit for the 
employees at the establishment of this Re-
spondent . 
. Q. Very well, then, Mr. Harter. Do I under-
stand you to say that the employee unit 
that you ha¥e heretofore defined is the ap-
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propriate and proper unit to bargain with 
the managemenU 
MR. CALLISTER: Just a moment. We object 
to it on the ground that it is calling for a 
conclusion. It is for the Board to determine 
this unit. 
MR. BECK: No. That was, the ground of your 
other objection. 
MR. CALLISTER: I think you may set forth 
what the facts are to assist the board in 
making its determination, but I think for 
him to give his conclusions is of no eviden-
tiary value, because the Commission is not 
bound by it and and we are not bound by 
it. When he attempts to give his conclusions 
what is the appropriate unit, he is thereby 
taking away from this Commission that au-
thority. 
BY MR. BECK: 
Q. All right then, Mr. Harter. So there can be 
no mistake about it, the unit that you have 
defined will be commonly known and desig-
nated as a laundry unit within the Hotel 
Utah~ 
.A. Yes. 
Q. And over that unit your organization takes 
jurisdiction? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. How many employees is the laundry unit in 
the Hotel Utah compos·e~ of~ 
.A. · .Approximately thirty-five. 
Q. Thirty-five. .And those are the employees 
composing such unit and are for the most 
part engaged there directly or indirectly 
contributing-I mean engaged in launder-
ing~ 
.A. Yes. 
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This petitioner introduced into the record the Utah 
Labor Relation's Board Case No. ;), which was held in 
1937, in which the Building Service Employees Local 
No. 59 was the petitioner for investigation and certifi-
cation with re~pect to certain einployees of the Hotel 
Utah. ~\t this hearing the Utah Labor Relations Board 
found that the appropriate unit for the purpos,es of col-
lective bargaining was housekeeping, passenger elevator, 
freight elevator, doonnan, package room, fountain, valet 
shop, print shop, engineers, electricians, carpenters, fur-
niture finishers and laundry (Tr. 172, 173). 
The Utah Labor Relations· Board, after a hearing 
in that cause, found that the appropriate unit was what 
is usually termed the service unit, which included the 
job classifications herein enumerated. As a matter of 
fact, the Union alleged that the job classifications herein 
mentioned would constitute a unit appropriate for the 
purposes of collective bargaining. 
The statements of Mr. Harter (Tr. 174) are very 
significant. We feel that they are important enough to 
set forth in this brief: 
"BY MR. CALLISTER: 
Q. Mr. Harter, you say you are familiar with 
the operations of the Hotel Utah Company¥ 
A. The laundry department. 
Q. Is that all you are familiar with¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't know anything about the other ser-
vice units, then, I assume¥ 
A. No sir. 
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Q. Then how can you tell this Board in your 
opinion that the Laundry constitutes an ap-
propriate unit if you don't know anything 
about the operations of the rest of the Hotel 7 
A. We don't have anything to do with organiz-
ing the rest of the hotel. All we do is the 
laundry. 
Q. That is right, because you are only organizer 
for the laundry, and that is the reason why 
you think that is the appropriate unit~ 
A. Sure that is right. 
The only reason Mr. Harter feels the Laundry 
IS the appropriate unit is because that is all he is re-
quired to organize, and that is all the employ~ees that 
he has apparently been able_ to organize. The basis for 
determining an appropriate unit certainly should not 
only be the various departments that the Union is able 
to organize. Apparently, this is the thinking of the Utah 
Labor Relations Board. 
If this is the basis for determining an appropriate 
unit, then there is no necessity of holding a hearing and 
receiving evidence with respect to what constitutes an 
appropraite unit. All that should be done is to have the 
Union advise the Board what departments they are able 
to organize, and then ask that that be determined to be 
the appropriate unit. 
The National Labor Relations Board, and properly 
so, has found that certain factors should be taken into 
consideration in determining the unit. We have enum-
erated these factors. 
The duty and power to determine the appropriate-
ness of the unit is vested by the Act in the Utah Labor 
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Relations Board. It does not pernlit the Utah Labor 
Relations Board to delegate that duty to the Union. 
Fron1 the facts in this case there i~ no other alternative 
than to assmne that the Board has delegated that power 
to the Union, because had the union requested other 
employees besides the Laundry, no doubt it would have 
complied with the request of the Union. 
The Board in making its detennination, has wholly 
disregarded the testi1nony of the petitioner by reference 
to past determinations of this Board. The petitioner fur-
ther introduced evidence with respect to what consti-
tuted an appropriate unit (Tr. 204, 205). 
The Board, in making its determination, has wholly 
disregarded the prior determination by the Utah Labor 
Relations Board; wholly disregarded any testimony with 
respect to what constituted an appropriate unit. 
The determination by the Board is arbitrary; fur-
ther, there is no evidence whatsoever to support its de-
termination. 
It is of the utmost importance that the Utah Labor 
Relations Board, having been given such broad power in 
respect to the facts, should be scrupulously careful to 
see that the power is exercised with a commensurate 
sense of what is just and fair, and to let its actions dem-
onstrate that it do so. See Natio11;al Labor ReZations 
Board v. Western Cartridge Co., 138 F·ed. 2d 551. 
It is very important to this petitioner that a unit 
should be determined or found that is appropriate in 
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view of all of the various factors present at its estab. 
lishment. Certainly it is the duty of the Board to make 
a thorough and intelligent investigation with respect 
to what constitutes an appropriate unit. 
The Board fails in its duty when it permits the 
Union to determine what shall constitute the appropriate 
unit, based upon what it is able to do in the waiY of 
organization. By accepting this standard the Board en-
tirely disregards the purposes of the Utah Labor Rela-
tions Act. 
The Board acted arbitrarily and in abuse of its 
discretion in acting in compliance with the request of 
the Union when there was no evidence to support it. 
We respectfully submit that the Board cannot find 
a unit to be appropriate without evidence to support 
it in accordance with the factors enumerated by the 
National Labor Relations Board. 
The reason we have referred to the policy of the 
National Labor Relations Board is becaus,e of the fact 
that they are administering an Act identical with that 
of the Utah Labor Relations Act. That is, the cases 
we have referred to and the policy of the Board was 
prior to the amendment lmown as the Taft-Hartley 
Law. The fact that the Utah Labor Relations Board 
has gone absolutely contrary, without any reason for 
was contrary to the unit found in this case. 
so doing, to the policies as set down by the National 
Labor Relations Board, clearly demonstrates its arbi-
trariness and bias. 
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The Board'~ order clearly den1onstrates its utter 
di~regard for eYidence or precedent. 
By precedent. we n1ean the precedent with respect 
to the unit, prPYiously found b~· this Board, which unit 
"~e submit that the Board's order is contrary to 
Title 49. 
The Board n1ust Inake a finding as to what con-
stitute; an appropriate unit; and there must be sub-
stantial eYidence to support such finding. 
The fact that the Union is only able to organize one 
department, does not warrant the Board in determin-
ing that that is the appropriate unit for the purposes 
of collective bargaining. 
ASSIGN~fENT OF ERROR NO. 4 
THE UTAH LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ER.RED IN 
PROVIDING IN ITS ORDER THAT HOTEL UTAH COM-
PANY CEASE AND DESIST FROM ANY FURTHER UN-
FAIR LABOR PRACTICE AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 49-1-
16, SUBSECTION 1, PARAGRAPH D, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1943, AS AMENDED. 
Section 49-1-16, Subsection D, provides as follows: 
''To refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representative of a majority of his ,employees in 
any collective bargaining unit; provided, that 
when two or more labor organizations claim to 
represent a majority of the employees in the 
bargaining unit the employer shall be free to 
file with the board a petition for investigation 
of certification of representatives and during the 
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pendency of such proceedings the employer shall 
not be demed to have refused to bargain." 
It will be noticed that Subsection D provides that 
it shall be an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain 
in any collective bargaining unit. 
As the record shows, there are other departments 
in the hotel than the laundry workers. There could be 
and are many other units for the purpose of collectiYe 
bargaining. The order provides as follows: 
''That respondent, Hotel Utah Company, 
cease and desist from any further unfair labor 
practice as set forth in Section 49-1-16, Subsec-
tion 1, Paragraph D, Utah Code .Annotated, 1943, 
as amended.'' 
We cannot understand why the Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board would incorporate in its order the statute. 
By doing so, it is directing that this company cease and 
desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the 
representative of a majority of its employees in any 
collective bargaining unit. This it does not have the 
power to do. 
Assuming for argument sake, that the board has 
the power and the rig·ht to make and enter its order as 
it has done (Tr. 32), then, in that event, it could only 
direct that the Hotel Utah Company cease and desist 
from any unfair labor practice with reference to refus-
ing to bargain collectively in the unit known as the 
laundry workers. 
Without any question the literal language of the 
order goes beyond what the Board no doubt intended. 
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It is only fair to the petitioner that there be no 
question a~ to the interpretation of the Board's order; 
particularly. before any enforce1nent ordPr 1nay be 
i~sued upon conten1pt proceedings. A party is entitled 
to a definition a~ exact as the circun1stances pennit of 
the acts for which it n1ust cease and desist frmn, only 
on pain of conten1pt of court. 
If this Honorable Court is called upon to enforce 
tlw order of the Utah Labor Relations Board, then this 
order becmnes that of the Court. Court orders are 
not to be trifled ''ith, nor should they invite litigation 
as to their meaning. See J. I. Case Company vs. N~a­
timwl Labarr Relations Board, 88 L. Ed. 769, 321 U. S. 
341. 
\Y e subn1it that the order of the Board is not in 
conformance with the evidence in this cause. It Is, 
therefore, void. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5 
THE UTAH LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DID NOT 
HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE ANY ORDER O:ij. 
MAKE ANY FINDINGS. 
Section 49-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, subsection 
(c) provides in part as follows : 
''Whenever a question affecting intrastate 
commerce or the orderly operation of industry 
arises concerning the representation of employ-
ees * * *." 
Section 49-1-18 provides in part as follows: 
''The board is empowered, as hereinafter pro-
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vided, to prevent any person from engaging in 
any unfair labor practice affecting commerce or 
the orderly operation of industry * * *.'' 
We refer this Honorable Court to the complaint 
filed in this cause (Tr. 7). Paragraph 1 of said com-
plaint provides as follows: 
'' 1. That Hotel Utah Company, hereinafter 
referred to as respondent, is a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of the State of Utah and 
as such is doing business in Salt Lake City, 
Utah.'' 
There is no allegation that there is a question af-
fecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of 
industry. 
Nor is there any allegation that any person, or par-
ticularly the Hotel Utah, is engaging in any unfair labor 
practice affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly 
operation of industry. 
Assuming, for the purpose of this argument, that 
the findings of fact of the Trial Examiner (Tr. 19) is 
that of the Board, nowhere is there any finding that the 
unfair labor practice in any way affects intrastate com-
merce or the orderly operation of business. 
The Utah Labor Relations Board is a creature of 
statute, any action brought by the Board against any em-
ployer is a special one brought under a statutory provi-
sion to enforce a statutory cause of action. In this 
situation there is no presumption of jurisdiction. J ur-
isdictional allegations are an integral and necessary part 
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of the case, without the state1uent of which there is no 
cause of action, for it is obvious that one who seeks the 
benefit of a. statute 1nust bring hi1nself within its pro-
visions. See Furbreeders Agricultural Coope.rative v. 
TITiesley, 132 P. 2d 384. (Utah case) 
This petitioner contends that in v1ew of the fact 
that there are no allegations to jurisdiction of this court, 
no evidence to substantiate any allegations if such was 
made, and the further fact that no finding is made to 
invoke the jurisdiction of this Board, therefore, any 
order or any purported finding is of no force and effect. 
The Board cannot take jurisdiction of a subject 
matter unless and until such time that it alleges that 
the matter in controversy affects intrastate commerce 
or the orderly operation of business as provided for by 
law. This, of course, is in view of the fact that the 
Utah Labor Relations Board is a creature of statute, 
and that the Board's jurisdiction over such subject mat-
ter will not be presumed, but must be alleged and there 
must be evidence to support such allegation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order issued by the Utah . Labor Relations 
Board is void because of the failure of the Utah Board 
to make findings on material issues presented by the 
pleadings in this cause. As a matter of fact, the Board 
failed to make any findings whatsoever. 
The record discloses the further fact that if the 
Board made findings, they would be unsupported by 
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evidence as provided and required by Title 49-1-18. 
The record of this case conclusively shows that the 
Utah Labor Relations Board acted arbitrarily and in 
abuse of its discretion. 
It must have evidence to support a finding or de-
termination as to what constitutes an appropriate unit 
for the purpose of collective bargaining. It cannot 
arbitrarily accept the request of the Union as the basis 
for the determination as to what constitutes an appropi-
ate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The 
fact that the Union can only organize a certain group 
or only desires to organize a certain group, does not, 
in of itself, constitute sufficient evidence to support a 
finding as to what constitutes an appropriate unit. 
The substitution of a cross-check as a method of 
determining the desires of the employees for that of 
an election under the circumstances in this case, is arbi-
trary on the part of Utah Labor Relations Board and 
in abuse of its discretion. The mere fact that the Union 
does not desire an election and refuses to consent there-
to does not warrant the Board in granting their request 
for a cross-check. 
The fact that since 1939 the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has definitely followed a strict policy of 
granting an election when either party to a controversy 
questions the advisability of a cross-check or other 
method of determining a representative, should be given 
some weight. This policy was developed through experi-
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ence by the National Labor Relations Board. They 
ean1e to the conclusion that to better effectuate the pur-
poses of the National Labor Relations Act, it was neces-
sary to have an election in cases such as the one in 
question. Under the facts in ·this case, to substitute a 
cross-check for the democratic method of determining 
employees desire by secret ballot, is certainly arbitrary 
and in abuse of its discretion. 
It is further submitted that the Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board does not have jurisdiction of this case. To 
invoke jurisdiction the Utah Board must comply with 
the statute creating it. Therefore, no order or pur-
ported finding of this Board is of any effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, CALLISTER & LEWIS, 
Attotrneys for Pe:t~tioner 
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